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LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM IN THE HIS-
TORICAL IMAGINATION. By Joyce Appleby.• Cam-
bridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 1992. Pp. viii, 351. 
Cloth, $39.95; paper, $17.95. 
Cynthia Ward 2 
The so-called republican revival has established the historical 
bona fides of communitarian thought in the United States, affirmed 
its contributions to the construction of the American Constitution 
and offered scholars a new standpoint from which to criticize the 
premises of liberalism as they have been applied in the fields of his-
tory, political theory and jurisprudence. Most recently the litera-
ture has moved away from the standard polarization of liberal 
individualism and republican communitarianism as the northern 
and southern extremities of political theory. The old mutually ex-
clusive paradigms have given way to the concept of "liberal republi-
canism," an appellation that accurately implies a scholarly effort to 
demonstrate both historically peaceful coexistence between the two 
visions of human nature and society, and substantial conceptual 
overlap between them. The move toward synthesis comes from 
both the liberal and communitarian camps;J Professor Joyce Ap-
pleby's collection of essays fuels it with historical evidence. 
If the work of Bernard Bailyn,4 Gordon Woods and J.G.A. 
Pocock6 has demonstrated that liberal theory did not hold an un-
challenged position of philosophical dominance at the time of the 
I. Professor of History, University of California, Los Angeles. 
2. Associate Professor of Law, Arizona State University. 
3. From the republican revivalist end of the spectrum, well-known efforts in this direc-
tion include Frank I. Michelman, Super Liberal: Romance, Community, and Tradition in 
William J. Brennan, Jr.'s Constitutional Thought, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1261 (1991); Frank I. 
Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: Voting Rights, 
41 Fla. L. Rev. 443 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L.J. 
1539 (1988). From the liberal end, they include William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes: 
Goods, Vinues and Diversity in the Liberal State (Cambridge U. Press, 1991) ("worried lib-
eral" disputes both liberal philosophers and communitarian critiques of liberalism and argues 
that the modern liberal state is committed to distinctive, unified conception of public good). I 
have expressed skepticism about the move toward synthesis, in particular the assertion made 
by Michelman and Sunstein that a "liberal pluralism" which allows government reinforce-
ment of race- and/or gender-based separatism is consistent with the republican vision of com-
munity, in Ward, The Limits of "Liberal Republicanism':· Why Group-Based Remedies and 
Republican Citizenship Don't Mix, 91 Colurn. L. Rev. 581 (1991). 
4. See, e.g., Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Bel-
knap Press, 1967). 
5. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (U. N.C. 
Press, 1969). 
6. J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the 
Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton U. Press, 1975). 
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Founding, Joyce Appleby contests what she sees as an effort tore-
place liberal with republican theory as the unchallenged "winner" 
of the political debate in eighteenth-century America. While much 
scholarship has focused on the possible applications of a contempo-
rary synthesis between the liberal and republican visions, 1 Appleby 
attempts to build a case for the existence of "liberal republicanism" 
at the time of the Founding and among eighteenth-century think-
ers--especially Thomas Jefferson and his followers-whom histori-
ans have long depicted as classical republicans. Appleby's 
argument is not flawless, but she disinters important historical 
truths that are directly relevant to contemporary theoretical debates 
over equality, individuality and justice for the disadvantaged. 
Professor Appleby acknowledges the valuable contributions of 
the republican revivalists in bringing forth from our collective un-
conscious the historical reality that the Founders were not an undif-
ferentiat~d group of stick-figure liberals, obsessed by a vision of 
mankind as composed entirely of autonomous rational individuals 
making self-interested choices. Appleby does not argue with evi-
dence of a competing, republican paradigm, based on civic virtue 
and a common-minded citizenry willing to consider and implement 
a unified vision of the public good. But, at least with respect to 
Pocock, Appleby charges that disinterested scholarship has become 
advocacy, leading to the same sin committed by generations of lib-
eral-minded predecessors to the "new republicans" -that of enclos-
ing the colonial mind entirely within the confines of one political 
paradigm and dismissing the importance of facts which establish 
the simultaneous influence of another. 
Appleby maintains that this puts the civic republicans in viola-
tion not only of the evidence of history but of their own method-
ological principles. In Chapter Four she connects the methods used 
by Pocock and others to study liberalism and republicanism with 
their substantive results. Such a discussion is vital, since the choice 
of a methodology necessarily answers questions that are prior to 
substantive historical ones, defining what constitutes an historical 
problem and what counts as evidence of its existence or solution. 
Thus, Appleby must steer her argument through a methodological 
maze to be sure that she and Pocock are really addressing one an-
other. She proceeds both by challenging the revivalists' announced 
method of analyzing political history and by concluding that, even 
using their own accepted methods, the republican historians have 
failed adequately to support their claim that civic humanism domi-
7. See, e.g., Michelman, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1261 (cited in note 3); Michelman, 41 Fla. L. 
Rev. 443 (cited in note 3); Sunstein, 97 Yale L.J. 1539 (cited in note 3). 
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nated political thought at the time of the founding of the American 
republic. 
Rejecting existing methodologies for the study of political 
thought, Pocock and a small group of other scholars "urged instead 
the adoption of a methodology springing from social linguistics. 
Under their collective prompting both intellectual history and the 
history of ideas have given place to the study of ideology conceived 
of as a structure of meaning expressed through a historically specific 
system of communication." Pocock drew on the work of Thomas 
Kuhns to characterize such "systems of communication" as mutu-
ally exclusive paradigms which determined the thought and polit-
ical prescriptions of the American Founders. Appleby challenges 
the revisionists' assumption that "one language of social analysis 
precludes the coexistence of others." She charges that an important 
part of the language and conceptions of human action in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries was the birth of liberal theory aris-
ing from the imaginative attempt to explain the expansion and 
success of the market as a regulator of human affairs. The first few 
essays in the book develop an historical case for this contention, and 
Appleby then criticizes the republican revisionists for failing to rec-
ognize it: 
"A complex plural society will speak a complex plural lan-
guage," Pocock has written .... One of the strands in the "com-
plex plural language" in seventeenth-century England came from 
writings about the nature of the market. While not strictly 
speaking political, the frequently made assertions that trade pos-
sessed its own natural laws and hence was not susceptible to reg-
ulation carried profound implications about government's 
authority. Indeed, one might say that if, as Pocock has insisted, 
the supremacy of civic humanist values forestalled the appear-
ance of a bourgeois ideology with the entrepreneur as citizen, so 
the study of economics disclosed a way for making that paragon 
of civic humanism-the disinterested citizen-an irrelevant 
figure. 
Appleby argues that Pocock's partisan attempt to achieve "the 
dethronement of the paradigm of liberalism, and of the Lockean 
paradigm associated with it" gives a soundly conservative cast to 
his revisionist story. She repeatedly cites the Pocockian method-
ological premise, "men cannot do what they have no means of say-
ing they have done; and what they do must in part be what they can 
say and conceive that it is," pointing out that this principle has 
8. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (U. of Chi. Press, 2d ed. 
1970). 
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"tended to strengthen the case which has been made for the histori-
cal-mindedness of seventeenth-century Englishmen," especially 
their conviction that human history was doomed to move in cycles, 
that new departures from it were impossible and that dramatic 
changes in society were more threatening than exciting. But Ap-
pleby points out that this view leaves no room for human imagina-
tion to reach out for new language to explain events which do not fit 
into existing historical or philosophical boxes. Such creativity, con-
tends Appleby, led to the delineation of the liberal theory of human 
nature in response to observed human behavior in the market for 
which there was no classical explanation. Available to political the-
orists at the time was not merely one linguistic paradigm-the 
classical vision of civic republicanism-through which men could 
voice their concerns and reactions to events, but the competing, im-
aginative liberal paradigm, upon which men could and did draw in 
both economic and political argument: 
[T]here were other languages available and used. As important 
as the financial and glorious revolutions were in the [republican] 
history of ideology the commercial revolution was even more im-
portant. Here a paradigm like Kuhn's scientific ones had to be 
invented. The worries about the Bank of England and the na-
tional debt in no way precluded men from responding to the 
abounding evidence of economic change in politically explosive 
ways. Indeed, many writers managed to think in both languages, 
pointing out the dangers of political corruptions from extended 
patronage while analyzing the new market economy with a to-
tally different vocabulary. 
So far, Professor Appleby's argument is strong; in particular, 
she does a great service in these deterministic days by rescuing a 
well-documented role in political thought for human creativity. 
But Appleby seeks to do more than demonstrate the mere coexis-
tence of the liberal and classical paradigms; she attempts to show 
the presence in the Founders' political lexicon of the synthetic con-
cept of "liberal republicanism." 
Here, Appleby builds her argument around the thought of 
Thomas Jefferson, generally considered to be the most prominent 
devotee of classical republicanism among the Founders. Appleby 
contends that this view of Jefferson and his followers is wrong, and 
that exposure of Jefferson's real views reveals a concept of "liberal 
republicanism" which belies Pocock's claims that Locke and other 
English liberal thinkers had minimal influence on the founding of 
the American republic. Her attempt is to use Jefferson's writings 
and those of thinkers he admired to demonstrate Jefferson's opposi-
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tion to the most important tenets of civic humanism. For example, 
she makes a convincing case that Jefferson's vision of the American 
experiment was aspirational and forward-looking-that he had a 
strong sense of the newness of the Founders' Constitutional experi-
ment, and believed in its possibilities-as contrasted with the pessi-
mistic, reactionary feeling of classical republicans, who believed 
that change was either threatening or impossible. 
Of course, Jefferson's progressive view of human nature might 
not have divorced him from the substance of classical republican 
thought, which emphasized altruism, the cultivation in citizens of 
civic virtue, the primacy of the "public good" over individual au-
tonomy, and a profound mistrust of capitalism as a corrupting influ-
ence on the attainment of these social goals. But Appleby opposes 
Jeffersonian thought to that of classical republicans on every one of 
these points. She contends first that Jefferson believed in the sanc-
tity of the individual and in the beneficial results of encouraging 
capitalistic enterprise: 
What was distinctive about the Jeffersonian economic policy was 
not an anticommercial bias, but a commitment to growth 
through the unimpeded exertions of individuals whose access to 
economic opportunity was both protected and facilitated by gov-
ernment. . . . What had given a sacred underpinning to Locke's 
contract theory was his assumption that men living under God's 
law were enjoined to protect the life, liberty, and property of 
others as well as their own. Jefferson perceived that Locke's 
identity of interests among the propertied could be universalized 
in America and thereby acquire a moral base in natural design. 
Second, Appleby opposes Jefferson's respect for the primacy of pri-
vate interests to classical republican advocacy of sacrifice for the 
community: 
Again he [Jefferson] reversed the priorities implicit in the classi-
cal tradition. The private came first. Instead of regarding the 
public arena as the locus of human fulfillment where men rose 
above their self-interest to serve the common good, Jefferson 
wanted government to offer protection to the personal realm 
where men might freely exercise their faculties. Appleby con-
cludes that, by presenting classical republican thought "as encap-
sulating Americans within a closed ideology" at the time of the 
Founding, "the republican revisionists have gone beyond their 
evidence." 
But Appleby's attempt to prove that the presence of liberal 
themes in Jefferson's writings did not simply represent the coexis-
tence of two, competing paradigms, but rather the formation of a 
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third one which synthesized them, is ultimately unsuccessful. She 
raises this problem, but makes only a weak attempt to solve it: 
It is of course possible that Jefferson and his followers were si-
multaneously liberal and classical, as Banning has argued. How-
ever, when we find a man as methodologically reflective as 
Jefferson repeatedly stating that his party distinguished itself by 
its commitment to scientific advances in the knowledge of gov-
ernment, by its faith in the self-governing capacities of ordinary 
men, and by its liberation from reverence for the past, it makes 
good sense to believe him. Not to do so is to interpret his tri-
umph as a defeat and to construe the emergence of liberalism as a 
disappointing capitulation to the overpowering force of economic 
development. 
In one way this conclusion simply misses the point; if in fact 
our goal is to discover the truth and not necessarily to represent 
Jeffersonian thought (or, for that matter, American liberalism) as a 
triumph, it is necessary to consider the possibility that American 
liberalism was in fact a "disappointing capitulation" to the emer-
gence of market capitalism. But Appleby's main point seems to be 
that the evidence does not support that conclusion. Historically, 
she leaves us in doubt on that point; because she spends little time 
discussing Jefferson's communitarian views or explaining how she 
thinks they worked together with his more liberal statements, read-
ers are left wondering if Jefferson was not merely a mislabelled lib-
eral, or whether he simply held conflicting views on these matters. 
However-and perhaps most important-Appleby's attempt 
does bring out historical facts that have direct (perhaps unin-
tended?) relevance to political debate today. As she notes herself, 
scholarly critiques of liberalism have proven so successful in aca-
demic circles that they have opened a wide conceptual divide be-
tween the American intelligentsia and much of the rest of world, 
particularly in the wake of the liberal revolutions in Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union. Appleby comments on "the irony that the 
perdurability of liberalism and its supportive systems of capitalism 
and democracy have been demonstrated for much of the world at 
the very time that in its homelands doubts about the virtues of liber-
alism are widespread." Her book offers a possible key to under-
standing the initial excitement of the nations of Eastern Europe 
over their chance to achieve liberal democracy at a time when many 
intellectuals in the Western democracies themselves seem bent on 
disparaging it. Appleby does this by disinterring historical truths 
about liberalism and communitarianism that appear to have 
dropped out of the Western academic zeitgeist. 
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First, liberal capitalism was revolutionary. In Appleby's 
language: 
[T]he American Revolution developed its revolutionary charac-
ter not by redeeming the rights of Englishmen, but by denying 
English sovereignty and the conceptual order which tied liberty 
to the English constitution. Deliverance from the strictures of 
classical republicanism came from the ideology of liberalism, 
from a belief in a natural harmony of benignly striving individu-
als saved from chaos by the stability worked into nature's own 
design. 
Liberals opposed their revolutionary belief in individual autonomy 
and equal rights to the reactionary, pessimistic forces of classical 
republicans. Liberalism was a response of visionary outrage by rev-
olutionaries to the constraints on human possibilities assumed by 
republican communitarianism. 
Second, this liberalism was egalitarian. Opposing the belief of 
civic humanists that hierarchies among people would always exist 
and that a stable government should reflect and reinforce them, lib-
erals constructed a view of human beings as fundamentally rational 
and politically equal, making possible both political democracy and 
the limitation of State intervention in the lives of citizens-that is, 
the creation of the public/private dichotomy: 
The appeal of a market society for Americans [was] its capacity 
to enlist the voluntary efforts of men and thereby permit the dis-
mantling of the customary institutions of control. This possibil-
ity gave to liberalism that utopian quality which infected men of 
all ranks .... 
Where politics achieved stability by imposing its structure of 
power, the economy appeared to elicit voluntary participation as 
it wove ever more extensive networks of free exchange. It also 
discovered a rationality in the humblest person whose capacity to 
take care of himself could be used as an argument for 
freedom .... 
Appleby cites the crucial liberating role played by another tar-
get of liberalism's critics-abstraction: 
It would be hard to exaggerate the subversive role abstract rea-
soning played in this retreat from [civic humanist emphasis on] 
politics. Science became the lodestar for those who thought they 
were at the dawn of a new age; modem scientists, not ancient 
philosophers, guided them into the future; the inquiring mind 
presented itself as the inexhaustible resource for endless improve-
ment. The importance of the free market to this development 
cannot be reduced to economics. 
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Attempts at such reductionism, contends Appleby, reflect ideologi-
cal imports from subsequent generations of historical theorists: 
Liberalism and capitalism have undeniable historical links, 
but the concept of capitalism that we use today only obscures 
their connection in the eighteenth century .... For us the end of 
capitalism is the accumulation of capital, the means to that end 
the capitalist's organization of hired labor, and the social conse-
quence a permanent division between dependent laborers and in-
dependent employers. Attached to the notion of a bourgeois 
ethic, the culture produced by this capitalism appears in an alto-
gether different light from the Jeffersonian vision. Constricting 
rather than generous, manipulative rather than emancipating, its 
values never rise above the interests of its beneficiaries. 
In contrast, liberals in the eighteenth century saw market-ena-
bled individualism as both egalitarian and virtuous. Liberals, con-
tends Appleby, didn't drop the notion of virtue from the political 
lexicon-they redefined virtue to embrace egalitarian individualism. 
The notion of the self-generated, industrious human being, acting 
without the yoke of political coercion from community norms en-
forced by the state, was utopian rather than evil. 
Appleby's evidence also contradicts reductionist depictions of 
liberalism that have become routine among its communitarian crit-
ics. Liberalism, on her view, was a partial reaction to certain per-
ceived faults in the pre-market economic and political order. It 
neither denied all benefits of community deliberation nor set itself 
up as a complete replacement for the values of citizenship or altru-
ism. It merely added to those values the possibility of making indi-
vidual freedom a reality, on an equal basis, for all people. 
Appleby balances her discussion of the positive historical role 
played by liberal theory with enumeration of liberalism's faults as 
they have been delineated by scholars in this century. She cites 
some flaws that would surely be acknowledged by most readers-
e.g., the assumption of early liberal theorists that market-based cap-
italism was based on natural law rather than human imagination; 
and some that are much more debatable-e.g., the identification of 
liberalism as having a "masculine personality," a choice of phrase 
which seems to move beyond the merely descriptive claim that lib-
eral capitalism (and all other political systems) have historically 
been dominated by men to the as-yet unproven assertion made by 
radical feminists that liberalism is somehow necessarily male.9 
Ultimately, Appleby's book adds substantially to the debate 
9. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Harv. 
U. Press, 1988). 
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over possible syntheses between liberal and communitarian theories, 
where the most important political question is: If communitarian-
ism and liberalism can be shed of the "historical imagination"-
that is, communitarianism purged of its historical love for hierarchy 
and exclusion, and liberalism viewed without its negative Marxist 
gloss and thereby revealed as having the potential to achieve human 
equality and freedom-at what point are the two philosophies in 
fundamental conflict? Can the idea of "liberal community" Ap-
pleby attempts to locate in the thought of the Founding Fathers rest 
on the common aspiration of both philosophies, at least in their 
contemporary forms, for equality, inclusion and freedom for all 
human beings? Appleby, an historian, does not even attempt to an-
swer this question, but her evidence contributes significantly to the 
synthetic project by making clear that the vision of liberalism held 
up by post-Marxist historians excludes crucial elements which may 
explain its appeal not only to eighteenth-century Americans but to 
the twentieth-century revolutionaries of Eastern Europe and the So-
viet Union. Indeed, the question of synthesis may have special sig-
nificance for politicians and scholars in those countries, where the 
attempt to construct stable democratic institutions presents political 
leaders with the inescapable necessity of finding a permanent way to 
balance strong communitarian socialization with liberal yearnings 
for equality, unassailable individual rights and freedom from domi-
nation by the state. 
CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CON-
GRESS, 1863-1869. By Earl M. Maltz.! Lawrence: Univer-
sity Press of Kansas. 1990. Pp. xiii, 198. $25.00. 
Michael P. Zuckert 2 
Earl Maltz mostly has the right idea about the Fourteenth 
Amendment. That is no small matter in a field so fertile with schol-
arly squabbling as this one is. Text, history and current significance 
all conspire to make the Amendment one of the most pock-marked 
battle fields of our legal wars of the words. The language of the 
Amendment, it is often said, presents hardly more determinative 
meaning than an ink blot: large terms, full of sound and ominous 
boding, but signifying nothing very specific. Historical investiga-
tion has not produced much more decisive evidence about the origi-
1. Professor of Law, Rutgers University (Camden). 
2. Congdon Professor of Political Science, Carleton College. 
